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Abstract—The confidentiality of communications in the In-
ternet of Things (IoT) is critical, with cryptography currently
being the most widely employed method of ensuring it. Estab-
lishing cryptographically secure communication links between
two transceivers requires the pre-agreement on some key, un-
known to an external attacker. In recent years there has been
growing attention in techniques that generate a shared random
key through observation of the channel and its effects on the
exchanged messages. In this work we present SKYGlow, a novel
scheme for secret-key generation, designed for IoT devices, such
as IEEE 802.15.4 and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) transceivers.
SKYGlow employs the Discreet Cosine Transform (DCT) of
channel observations and Slepian-Wolf coding for information
reconciliation. Real-life experiments have resulted in the creation
of 128-bit secret keys with only 65 packet exchanges and with an
entropy of 0.9978 bits, making our scheme much more energy-
efficient compared with others in the existing literature.
I. INTRODUCTION
The vision of an Internet of Things (IoT) is coming closer
to realization with each passing day, where physical objects
will have virtual representations, and the ability to be remotely
controlled or act as physical access points to Internet services
[1]. However, this vision introduces new security risks since
attackers can potentially gain access to systems considered
so far as secure. Furthermore, the broadcasting nature of
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), which will form a large part
of the IoT, makes communications prone to eavesdropping,
increasing the need for confidentiality, which currently is
accomplished by cryptographic schemes.
Unfortunately, the nodes that will comprise these WSN
are very constrained in hardware space, processor power and
battery life, making them weak, both in terms of security
measures and computational capabilities. Hence, high-level
security services, such as traditional cryptographic protocols
that require key distributions or certificate management [2],
might not be sufficiently efficient for IoT devices. Due to this,
in recent years there has been a renewed effort into devising
security schemes that reside in the physical layer and can
supplement novel lightweight cryptographic protocols [3]–[5].
Physical-layer security constitutes a promising direction for
securing the IoT. By using measurements of the common chan-
nel between them, two transceivers can agree to a bit sequence
that can be then used as a seed for a cryptographic primitive
or as an encryption key. Using the theory of reciprocity for
antennas and electromagnetic propagation, and assuming that
bidirectional transmissions occur inside the coherence time,
methods [6], [7] have been proposed for the communicating
parties to agree to a key based on these channel observations.
In this paper we present SKYGlow (Secret KeY Gen-
erator for LOW powered devices), a physical layer secret-
key generation scheme designed for IoT devices. SKYGlow
adopts a Discreet Cosine Transform (DCT) stage that can
enhance the performance of key generation in comparison
to the previously-proposed similar schemes. We evaluate the
performance of SKYGlow on experimental data, collected in a
test-bed of three off-the-shelf IEEE 802.15.4 transceivers that
use the Texas Instrument’s CC2650 chipset [8]. In line with
previous works, we evaluate the entropy of the generated keys.
In addition, we examine the likelihood of an eavesdropper
managing to reconstruct the secret-key, assuming that she has
access to all unencrypted information exchanged between the
legitimate communicating parties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
covers prior work in the domain. Section III defines the
threat model and the characteristics of the eavesdropper, while
Section IV describes our scheme, and elaborates on each stage.
Section V describes our methodology and experimental set-
up, and presents our results, followed by Section VI where
we present our conclusions.
II. PRIOR WORK
The theoretical framework on secret-key extraction was laid
in [9] where the authors examined the process of generating
a common random key at two terminals, without letting an
eavesdropper obtain information about this key. Since then,
there have been a number of papers that present algorithms
or implementations that can realise such a process with mixed
results [10]–[14]. The process is generally as follows:
1) The legitimate communicating parties, Alice and Bob,
exchange and observe messages transmitted in a poten-
tially insecure manner.
2) The effects of the channel on the exchanged message
are measured. This corresponds to the first process seen
in Figure 1, and in our case it is a measurement of the
Received Signal Strength (RSS) of each message.
3) The time-series created from the RSS values are quan-
tized to result to a sequence of zeros and ones.
4) As the transceivers are not fully duplex there is a
certain time delay between receiving and transmitting
a message. This affects the reciprocity of the channel as
it variates with time. Furthermore, our transceivers’ RSS
measurements can be imprecise. Thus the sequences of
zeros and ones that Alice and Bob create might have
some discrepancies. These are reconciled, either through
some form of error correction [5], [15] or through some
reconciliation protocol like Cascade [12]. There are
also some cases where the scheme sacrifices entropy
and randomness to result in two sequences that are
completely similar after quantization, as seen in [16].
5) Finally, when the two sequences are identical, they
typically go through the process of privacy amplification.
This is necessary, as it is common for the bit sequences
to have low entropy. By performing a transformation
to increase key entropy and obfuscate any partial in-
formation an eavesdropper may have gathered during
key reconciliation. However, this reduces the size of the
secret-key.
SKYGlow works in a similar way, yet includes an extra stage
between sampling the channel and quantization, that performs
a DCT. As described in Section IV, all packet exchanges
lead to at least one secret bit being generated, in contrast to
other schemes in literature where a significant part of the RSS
values of exchanged packets are unused. This greatly reduces
the listening time and the number of wireless transmissions
that need to take place, making the process significantly more
energy-efficient. Furthermore the DCT stage is efficient and
easily implementable in IEEE 802.15.4 hardware, making it
ideal for IoT devices. Finally, our scheme generates keys
with very high entropy (more than 0.9961 bits) making the
Privacy Amplification stage unnecessary. This results in fewer
processing cycles on each device as well as a larger secret-key
which again makes our scheme more efficient.
III. THREAT MODEL
The objective of a secret-key creation scheme is to extract
a random, and shared by the two communicating parties, bit
sequence, while preventing the eavesdropper from being able
to reconstruct that key.
Before we continue then, we need to define the eaves-
dropper’s abilities. We assume that the eavesdropper, Eve,
can listen to all communications between the legitimate com-
municating parties, Alice and Bob. We also assume that the
eavesdropper can record the RSS values of the overheard
messages, although the resulting values are different than the
ones Alice and Bob measure, as Eve is further away from both
of them by at least the coherence distance [17]. Moreover,
we assume that Eve is completely passive, and she does
Fig. 1. Overview of SKYGlow.
not attempt to jam the medium, inject traffic or in general
transmit at any time. We make no assumption on the hardware
capabilities of Eve. We assume Eve has access to the syndrome
transmitted from Alice to Bob for error correction, and knows
how the protocol works, thus can try to use the syndrome to
recover the secret-key. For the rest of this paper the terms
Alice, Bob and Eve are used interchangeably with A, B and
E respectively.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section we elaborate on each stage of SKYGlow
and highlight how our scheme innovates compared to other
schemes in the existing literature. We stress that SKYGlow
does not require a privacy amplification stage since the entropy
of the generated keys is sufficiently high without it.
A. Sampling and DCT
Since SKYGlow is targeted for IoT devices with simple
hardware, i.e. one antenna and low computationally capabili-
ties, we use the RSS values of the received packets as the sam-
pling method on the effects of the channel on the exchanged
messages. We should note, that we have no information about
how exactly the RSS of each packet is calculated. We proceed
assuming that Alice and Bob calculate the RSS values in the
same way.
Instead of using the RSS values as input to the quantizer,
we first apply a DCT to those values. The DCT expresses a
finite sequence of data points (our RSS values) in terms of
a sum of cosine functions oscillating at different frequencies,
according to the following equation:
Xk =
N−1∑
n=0
xncos
[
pi
N
(
n +
1
2
)
k
]
k = 0, ..., N (1)
The major theoretical advantage of including a DCT stage
is that it allows us to discard at will the higher frequency
components that are mostly responsible for the bit mismatches.
Thus, the scheme is, in a sense tunable, and able to generate
more secret bits when there is a high degree of reciprocity,
or fewer bits when the channel is less symmetrical (due to
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Fig. 2. Top: An example of 64 RSS measurements. Middle: The respective
DCT transformation. Bottom: The final 128-bit secret key.
communications being half-duplex or if the coherence time of
the channel is less than the sampling period). An illustration of
the results of applying the DCT to a sequence of RSS values
can be seen in Figure 2.
B. Quantization
We then quantize xn and use the quantized values to produce
the secret-key. The more symmetrical the channel is, the more
cosine components will have the same amplitude.
A significant fraction of secret-key extraction schemes in
the literature use a quantizer like the one presented in [16], or
a variation of it. In the aforementioned, the mean, µ and the
standard deviation σ of the measurements are first calculated.
By using a coefficient α > 0, all the measurements that are in
the region [µ + ασ, µ − ασ] are discarded, in effect creating
a censoring region. Every value that is larger than µ + ασ
is then quantized as a 1 and everything smaller than µ − ασ
is quantized as 0. That ensures that only the high and low
extremes of the measurements, that have a higher degree of
correlation and are not a result of thermal noise, are actually
used for the key generation process. The coefficient α is used
to optimize the size of the censoring region. This approach
has two disadvantages. First, when Alice logs a value that
is outside her censoring region, but Bob’s measurement is
just inside it, the two sequences are desynchronized, which
leads to further errors. Moreover, the censoring region leads
to measurements being discarded, which translates to energy
being wasted. In the energy-conscious elements of the IoT
such a process is very inefficient.
Our proposed quantizer retains the use of µ and σ, however
these are calculated from the amplitudes of the cosine waves
after the DCT transform. In our case there is no censoring
region, instead the quantizer works with the following simple
formula:
Q(n) =

11, F (x) ≥ µ + σ,
10, F (x) ∈ [µ, µ + σ),
01, F (x) ∈ (µ − σ, µ),
00, F (x) ≤ µ − σ.
C. Information Reconciliation
Due to communications being half-duplex, the channel not
being completely symmetrical and the effects of thermal noise,
the RSS values between Alice and Bob have small deviations.
These small deviations can lead to deviations in the amplitude
of the cosine waves after the DCT and eventually, after
quantization occurs, to bit mismatches.
Other works in this field employ a variety of methods to deal
with these mismatches. In [16] the RSS values are filtered, to
discard the high-frequency components that are not correlated,
but that significantly reduces the entropy of the sequence.
Another common practice in related schemes is to employ
the Cascade Protocol [18]. However Cascade requires a large
number of channel communications between the parties to
proceed, which is unsuitable for IoT applications where the
devices are often battery-powered and communication comes
at a great energy cost [19].
SKYGlow can discard the cosine waves of higher frequen-
cies that tend to be responsible for the mismatches, depending
on the requirements of the implementation environment. That
can reduce the errors, but it also results in fewer secret-
bits per packet. Although that could be acceptable for certain
applications, in this paper, we opt for the approach that would
generate an 128-bit secret-key with the fewer number of
transmissions. Thus, we implement Information Reconciliation
with Slepian-Wolf Low Density Parity Codes (LDPC). To
reduce the amount of wireless transmissions needed to correct
mismatches, we limited the syndrome length to the largest that
would fit in the link layer payload of a IEEE 802.15.4 frame,
that is 1016 bits. Thus for error correction to occur we need to
send only one packet after the RSS values have been collected.
To satisfy that requirement for codewords of 128-bit length,
we employed a code rate of 7.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. Implementation
We implemented our system on three SmartRF06 evaluation
boards [20] using the CC2650 radio [8]. Two of the boards
act as Alice and Bob, while the third acts as Eve. In Figure 4,
we detail the spatial arrangement of Alice, Bob and Eve in
each scenario.
Commercial wireless transceivers are currently half-duplex,
thus the logged RSS values correspond to messages that have
a small time delay of each other. The process of message
exchange can be seen in Figure 3, where tp is the transmission
and propagation delay, tc the time needed for Bob to measure
the RSS value of the message and respond with another mes-
sage, and t f the time between two successive messages sent
Fig. 3. The methodology of RSS logging.
by Alice. To ensure the reciprocity of radio wave propagation
we have to keep the time between Alice’s first transmission
and Alice’s reception of a response as small as possible, and
lower than the coherence time of the channel. Successive
transmissions from Alice should take place after the coherence
time has elapsed though, otherwise the successive RSS values
are correlated and thus less random, which reduces the entropy
of the generated key. For the purposes of this work tp = 2.4
ms while tc = 7.8 ms and t f = 1 s.
Although SKYGlow can be tuned to produce secret-keys of
different size, we are mainly interested in IoT applications.
Hence, we aim to generate an 128-bit secret-key, with as few
transmissions as possible while keeping the entropy of the keys
high. As the quantizer of SKYGlow described in Section IV-B,
produces 2 bits for every DCT wave component, we use sets of
64 RSS values and a LDPC code of rate 7. Thus, for generating
an 128-bit secret-key, the scheme requires the exchange of
65 packets, including the syndrome, meaning that up to 1.96
secret bits per packet are generated.
B. Evaluation Metrics
To assess the performance of SKYGlow, we employ the
following metrics:
• Bit Error Rate (BER): similar to the way BER is used
in communication systems, we use BER to denote the
ratio of mismatches between the key that Alice and Bob
extract. Ideally BER would be 0 for Alice and Bob, and
0.5 for Eve.
• Key Agreement Rate (KAR): the probability of agreeing
on a key each time the scheme is executed. Ideally KAR
is equal to 1.
• Key Leakage Rate (KLR): the probability that Eve recon-
structs the correct secret-key from her observations and by
using the insecurely transmitted syndrome. Ideally KLR
is equal to 0.
• Secret Bits per Packet (SBP): the number of secret bits
generated from each packet exchange between Alice and
Bob. The highest the SBP, the fewer transmissions are
required for a key generation; thus, the more energy-
efficient the system is.
In addition, it is possible that the BER is so high that the
LDPC decoding is unable to correct the errors. Assuming that
KAR is denoted as 1−p, and that it takes N packets to generate
Fig. 4. Layout of experiment in office space.
a key, then the long term average number of packets needed
to agree to a key is:
E[N] =
∞∑
n=1
Npn−1(1 − p)n = N
1 − p ,
where N = 65 in our implementation.
Let us envision a security protocol that executes SKYGlow
periodically to generate new secret-keys with every block of
N packets. In this scenario, only the first syndrome would
be communicated unencrypted, while the following syndromes
can be encrypted with the previously generated key. Assuming
that KLR is denoted as q, we can estimate the long-term
average number of leaked packets, M , as follows:
E[M] =
∞∑
m=1
qm · E[N] = q
1 − q
N
1 − p .
E[N] and E[M] are also used as performance metrics,
considering that a smaller E[N] results to a more efficient
system, while a smaller E[M] suggests a more secure system.
C. Experimental Results
We evaluate SKYGlow in two realistic scenarios: an office
space with stationary terminals, and an office space with a link
between a mobile terminal and a stationary terminal. In these
scenarios, we collected sets of RSS values that lasted from
several hours (for the mobile scenarios) up to several days
(for the stationary scenarios). The results are summarized in
Table I.
1) Scenario 1: Office Space with stationary terminals:
We first evaluate SKYGlow in an open office space whose
layout can be seen in Figure 4. This scenario represents a very
likely application, especially as IoT devices find themselves
in residential and commercial locations. We examine two
different cases:
• The case where Alice and Bob have Line of Sight (LoS),
both in working and non-working hours
• The case where Alice and Bob do not have a direct
Line of Sight (nLos), but have to rely on multipaths
for communication. Again we examine both working and
non-working hours.
The LOS case is characterized by a strong dominant compo-
nent. Furthermore, during working hours, defined as the period
between 09:00-17:00, people are working in their offices with
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Stationary MobileLoS NLoS
A’s and B’s BER 0.0323 0.0072 0.0351
E’s BER 0.4832 0.4830 0.4853
KAR 0.8348 0.8970 0.8438
KLR 0.0067 0.01 0.0042
SBP 1.64 1.77 1.66
Average Key Entropy 0.9971 0.9977 0.9969
E[N] 77.66 72.34 76.91
E[M] 0.52 0.73 0.28
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Fig. 5. Top: KAR (blue) and E[N] (red) as a function of entropy. Bottom:
KAR (blue) and E[N] (red) as a function of correlation.
frequent movement. This leads to increased entropy [21] and
deviation of the RSS measurements. The KAR is 0.8348 and
the long term average of packets required to agree to an
128=bit key is 77.66, meaning that the SBP is 1.64 on average.
When lacking a direct line of sight between Alice and Bob,
communication relies on the multipaths, thus there is a slightly
higher entropy than in the LoS case. The KAR is 0.8970 and
the long term average of packets required to agree to an 128
bit-key is 72.34, meaning that the SBP is 1.77 on average.
2) Scenario 2: Mobile terminals: In the second scenario
we examine the communication between a stationary base-
station and a mobile terminal. This scenario was run in two
different circumstances, with the results being similar. As
Alice is moving around and out of the office space, LoS is
lost and re-established, the pathways change and thus there
was greater variation in the logged RSS values. The KAR is
0.8438 and the long term average of packets required to agree
to an 128-bit key is 76.91, meaning that the SBP is 1.66 on
average.
D. Discussion on the Results
From the above, it is easy to see that although there is
a chance of not agreeing on the key on the first attempt,
the probability of not agreeing on the second attempt is only
0.024, while on the third attempt is 0.0038. Thus it is virtually
guaranteed that after 195 packets a secret key is extracted.
Indeed, when a key generation fails, we recommend a new
attempt with a fresh block of 65 packets. An alternative
approach could be followed instead. When a disagreement
occurs, instead of discarding all packets and starting over,
Alice and Bob, could just use a quantizer that would result
in only one bit per DCT component, or define a censoring
region and use the more half more extreme measurements,
who would be better correlated. Although that increases the
chance of success, it follows that from our 64 samples, we
would only end with 64 bits, necessitating another 64 packets
to be transmitted. Thus we end up with 130 packets transmitted
(128 for the RSS values and 2 syndromes), which is exactly
the same as repeating the process once more.
The entropy and the correlation of the RSS values are, in
fact, two of the most important factors that govern the per-
formance of SKYGlow. Indeed, when the entropy is low, like
for example when the environment is almost completely static,
the changes in the RSS values are often due to thermal noise
or the result of a cause that is short enough to affect only one
side of the exchange. This creates uncorrelated randomness
that negatively affects performance. This is presented more
clearly in Figure 5. It can be observed that when the correlation
becomes less than 0.7 the long-term average of packets needed
to agree to a key becomes larger than 200. Similarly, when
the average entropy of the RSS value falls below 1.2 bits, the
long-term average required messages is more than 210.
However, it is important to note that for the vast majority
of the time during working hours, correlation is over 0.8 and
entropy over 1.5 bits for both the stationary scenario as well as
the mobile one, as can be seen in the cumulative distribution
graphs in Figure 6. Yet, during non-working hours, when the
environment is almost static and RSS variation is a result
of thermal noise and thus uncorrelated and unshared, perfor-
mance degenerates as entropy and correlation both reduce.
Correlation
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Fig. 6. Empirical cumulative distribution as a function of the correlation of
our samples (top) and the entropy of our sequences (bottom)
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
SBP Key Entropy
Patwari et al. [13] 0.05 − 0.44 0.9590
Ali et al. [16] 0.33 − 0.0370 0.9979
Revadigar et al. [23] 1 N/A
SKYGlow 1.64 − 1.7 0.9971
E. Comparison with Other Schemes
In Table II, we present a brief comparison of the perfor-
mance of SKYGlow against several state-of-the-art schemes
designed for IoT devices. We note that some of this works use
as a metric the number of secret-bits generated per second.
We consider that an inadequate metric for energy-constraint
IoT scenarios that are characterised by sparse communications.
Thus, we use the SBP metric that reflects the efficiency of the
key generation process. Furthermore, we limit our comparison
to schemes implemented on wither IEEE 802.15.4 or BLE
hardware. It can be observed that, in line with previous works,
SKYGlow generates keys with a very high entropy. Yet the
keys are generated in a more efficient manner, requiring fewer
transmissions between Alice and Bob. From the table we
omit [22], one of the newest proposed schemes, as from
the published paper there is no way to derive its SBP. We
note however that it produces up to 0.195 bits/second, while
SKYGlow produces more than 1.64 bits/second.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present a novel method for secret-key
generation between two IoT transceivers, with an emphasis
on energy conservation. Our contribution, named SKYGlow,
incorporates a DCT stage on the raw RSS samples, resulting
in better performance and sufficient entropy that makes a
privacy amplification stage unnecessary. Transforming the RSS
sequence with the DCT allows us to more finely tune the
scheme, as uncorrelated higher-frequency components can be
discarded at will. Finally Slepian Wolf Coding is employed
for information reconciliation. We verify our results on ex-
perimental data collected with off-the-shelf hardware, and
demonstrate that SKYGlow can generate 1.66 secret bits per
packet for mobile scenarios and 1.77 secret-bits per packet for
stationary scenarios, outperforming the current state-of-the-art
schemes for IoT devices, and allowing for both faster and more
efficient secret-key generation.
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